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Article 6

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS, FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
By MARVIN COOPFR*
Introduction
What rights and privileges does a witness who has been summoned
before a congressional investigating committee possess? The determination
of this question in the light of the congressional power of inquiry is one of
the most perplexing problems to face the courts in recent years. Since any
determination in favor of the individual necessarily puts limitations on the
power of inquiry, and vice-versa, consideration of the individual interests
cannot properly be made without consideration of the interests represented
by a congressional investigating committee.

Congressional Power of Investigation
Although the power of Congress to investigate is not found in express
terms in the Constitution, such power has been recognized by the Supreme
Court as being necessary and appropriate to carry out the legislative powers
expressly granted in the Constitution.1
The legislative powers granted in the Constitution cover wide areas.2 In
order to enact effective and desirable legislation in pursuance of its powers,
Congress must have the information necessary for sound legislative determination. To obtain the desired information investigation proceedings are
often necessary. Since the information is sought for legislative purposes,
the power of investigation is co-extensive with the power to legislate, that
is, any area in which Congress might properly legislate is an area subject
to congressional investigation.3
Information which might be necessary to a determination of legislative
policy is not always given voluntarily. To prevent a frustration of the legislative purpose, the power of investigation includes the power to compel
attendance of witnesses and the power to compel testimony.4
Congressional investigations are usually conducted by a committee or
a sub-committee of the committee. The committee may be one of the standing committees of the House or Senate, or it may be a committee created for
the purpose of conducting a specific investigation. 5 A committee is created
* Member, Second-Year Class.
1 Congress has such ". . . auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the
express powers effective . . . the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. ... " McGrain v. Daughtery, 273 U.S.
135, 173, 174 (1927).
2 See U.S. CowsT. art. I,§ 8.
3
McGrain v.Daughtery, supra note 1.
4 Ibid.
5
See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1956).
E322 ]
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by an authorizing resolution which is adopted by either the House or
Senate. This resolution is the committee's charter, giving to the committee
its power and also limiting its scope of authority.'
Although the power of investigation with process to enforce it is necessarily broad, it is not without its limits. Congress may not properly require
testimony the subject of which is outside the scope of inquiry as delineated
by the authorizing resolution; 7 nor may a witness be required to answer
questions which are not pertinent to the subject matter under investigation. 8
These limitations on a congressional committee's power of investigation
were felt to be inadequate for the protection of a witness.
In this respect the common law right of privacy was asserted to bar congressional investigation into private affairs in the early case of Kilbourn v.
Thompson.9 The Court held a congressional investigating committee to be
powerless to inquire into the private affairs of an individual and force their
disclosure. The basis of the decision was that to compel testimony relating
to private affairs was a judicialpower which could not be properly exercised
by the legislature.1" However, in a subsequent case the Supreme Court,
without mention of any intention to do so, abroghted the right of privacy
apparently recognized in Kilbourn.In Sinclairv. United States" the Court
decided that affairs are not private when their disclosure is pertinent to a
lawful investigation.
Witnesses appearing before a congressional investigating committee
must therefore assert other affirmative rights if they are to justify any
refusal to testify.' In this respect recalcitrant witnesses have asserted first
amendment freedom. This section of the Bill of Rights provides that
"Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of
to assemble, and to petition
the press; or of the right of the people peaceably
13
the Government for a redress of grievances.'
Although the rights guaranteed by this amendment are not absolute, and
its scope does not give immunity for every possible use of language,' 4 it does
forbid legislation which burdens, abridges, restricts or punishes the advocacy of ideas through the exercise of speech, press, or assembly.' 5 It is
also now settled that first amendment rights are available to a witness in a
congressional investigation proceeding.' 6
6 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1952).
7 Ibid.

8

Watkins v. United States, supra note S.
9 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
10 Id. at 192

1"279 U.S. 263 (1929).

12 A witness may in some cases refuse to answer upon the ground of self-incrimination.
It is not within the scope of this article to examine this field. For two recent cases discussing
this problem see Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1954), and Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155 (1955).

13 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
14 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
15 Terminielo v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ; Thomas v. Collins, 332 U.S. 516 (1945).

16 Watkins v. United States, supra note S.
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A Problem for the Courts
Thus the problem is whether a witness has the right to refuse to answer
material questions pertinent to a lawful inquiry by a congressional committee upon the ground that they invade rights protected by the first
amendment.
When the problem of resolving this complex issue was first brought
before lower federal courts, it resulted in a determination unfavorable
to the existence of any such right. In United States v. Josephson' the issues
regarding the first amendment do not seem to have been clearly presented,
by counsel nor clearly stated by the court. The witness, in refusing to be
sworn in and testify before the sub-committee of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities, based his refusal in part upon the contention that
the committee investigation was an unconstitutional excursion into the area
of speech, thought, and ideas protected by the first amendment. In considering this contention the court states, "The theory seems to be that the investigation of Un-American or subversive propaganda impairs in some way not
entirely clear the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."
(Emphasis added.) 1 8 Further, it is doubtful that the court recognized any
invasion of the witness' first amendment rights, for in considering the possibility of speech being restrained because of fear of disclosure of his unpopular ideas or beliefs the court said, "But this fear is not created by legal
restriction .... In short there is no restraint (on freedom of expression)
resulting from gathering of information by Congress ... which does not
wholly flow from the fact that the speaker is unwilling to advocate openly
what he would like to urge under cover."' 9 It appears that the court failed
to examine the practical results of compelling certain testimony. It also
failed to recognize that in compelling testimony congressional action would
be responsible for the results following such testimony. This problem will
be considered more fully later.
In Barsky v. United States2" the court assumed, without deciding, that
compelling a witness to answer questions regarding his communist affiliations would "impinge upon speech and not merely invade privacy."'" The
court nevertheless held that ". . . in view of the representations to the
Congress as to the nature, purposes and program of Communism and the
Communist Party.. .," the witness could be compelled to answer. 2 Thus
it appears that the court recognized that in some situations where there is
sufficient justification, first amendment freedoms may be restricted. A
rational basis for determining when invasion of a witness' first amendment
rights is to be allowed is not clearly presented in the opinion.
17 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947).
18 Id. at 91.
19 Id. at 92.
20 167 F.Zd 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
21 Id. at 250.
22

Ibid.
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The court expressly rejected the clear and present danger test23 as a
possible basis for determining when congressional inquiry may be made into
the area protected by the first amendment.' This test has been used to
determine when speech may warrant criminal sanction, but as the court
points out "it would be sheer folly.., for an existing government to refrain
from inquiry into potential threats to its existence of security until danger
is clear and present." The court goes on to say that inquiry is justified
"when danger is reasonably represented as potential."23 This test, or lack
of test, would seem to require at best only a determination of whether there
is a rational basis for the investigation and provides no standards for
evaluation.
A Decision by the Supreme Court
The first case to reach the Supreme Court in which the issue of first
amendment limitations on the congressional power of investigation was
squarely decided was Barenblatt v. United States.26 Barenblatt was summoned before a sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and was questioned as to his membership in and affiliation with
the Communist
Party. He refused to answer and was convicted of contempt
27
of Congress.
The conviction was affirmed by a closely divided Court. Mr. Justice
Harlan in the majority opinion said, "where First Amendment rights are
asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always
involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake... in the particular circumstances shown."2 8 He concluded that where the governmental interests outweigh individual interests
the provisions of the first amendment are not offended.

A Balance of Interest
In adopting the balancing of interests process, the Court is utilizing a
test which has long been applied in passing on the validity of state regulations designed to promote the public welfare but which in some manner
restrict first amendment freedoms as an incident thereto. 9
This test has also been used to determine the constitutionality of section
9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act which required that union
officers execute an affidavit stating that they are not Communists and do
23 This test was formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenk v. United States, 249 US. 47
(1919). See CHApE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 81-82 (1941) for a discussion of this
concept
as derived from the Schenk case.
24
Barsky v. United States, supra note 20, at 246.
25 Id. at 246, 247.
26360 U.S. 109 (1958).
27 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).
28360 U.S. at 126.
29
Thomas v. Collins, supra note 15; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);

Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).

[Vol. 11

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

not believe in Communist principals." The Court recognized that first
amendment freedoms would be abridged stating: ".

.

. (the statute's pro-

vision) undoubtedly lessens the threat to interstate commerce, but it has the
further necessary effect of discouraging the exercise of political rights protected by the first amendment. Men who hold union offices often have little
choice but to renounce Communism or give up their offices. Unions which
wish to do so are discouraged from electing Communists to office.""
The Court in the Barenblattcase, in considering the opposing interests
of the government and the individual, recognized the governmental interest
in national security and prevention of overthrow by force and violence. In
pursuance of such interest Congress has wide power to legislate in the field
of Communism and "to conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof"
because the tenets of the Communist Party include the overthrow of the
United States Government by force and violence.32
On the other side of the scale the individual interest was recognized as
Barenblatt's right to keep silent about his Communist affiliations, thereby
avoiding the adverse affects which would follow such disclosure.3 3 Of course
it is possible that the Court had in mind other factors to be weighed on the
side of the individual, but none are mentioned in the opinion.
Exercise of FirstAmendment Rights is Restricted
In order to determine what effects compelled disclosure of associational
relationships and political beliefs has upon first amendment freedoms, it is
necessary to consider the nature of the disclosure and the general public
attitude regarding the subject of the disclosure.
Where the great majority of the public looks upon certain beliefs with
great animosity, to require a witness to profess his faith in such beliefs is
to expose him to "public stigma, scorn and obloquy." This is a great deterrent to those who might embrace controversial or unorthodox views. 4
As pointed out by the Court in American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, "It is not often in this country that we now meet with direct and
candid efforts to stop speaking or publication as such. Modern inroads on
these rights come from associating the speaking with some other factor
which the State may regulate so as to bring the whole within official control." 5 Modern methods are more subtle and are therefore correspondingly
more dangerous since they may escape casual appraisal.
30 "When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, ... partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine
which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular
circumstances." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
31 Id. at 393.
32 Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 26, at 127.
33 Ibid.
34 This point has been made by Justice Black dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States,
supra note 26, by Chief Justice Warren in Watkins v. United States, supra note 5, by Judge
Egerton dissenting in Barsky v. United States, supra note 20, and by Judge Clark dissenting in
United States v. Josephson, supra note 17.
35 339 U.S. at 399.
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If this process of compelling testimony causes individuals to refrain
from expressing controversial opinions or-discussing issues subject to possible congressional inquiry, the purpose of free speech cannot be attained.
The purpose of speech as stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis makes this quite
clear. "Those who won our independence.., believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means inseparable to the discovery and spread of political truth; ...
that the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principal of the American government. ' 36
What Interests Should Be Balanced on the

Side of the Individual?
When using the balancing of interest process, a valid judgment cannot
be made until all the interests to be balanced are identified and given weight.
The government's interest has been stated as maintaining national security,
the prevention of overthrow by force and violence. The importance of the
governmental interest cannot be denied, but neither can the interest of the
individual.
One thing that should be balanced on the side of the individual interest
is the adverse effects which follow the compelled disclosure of unpopular
ideals and associations, i.e. loss of prestige, employment and friends. Reports to the House of Representatives by the Un-American Activities Committee cite many examples of witnesses being forced from their jobs follow37
ing their appearance before the Committee.
Another thing that should be balanced on the side of the individual
interest is the more important public interest in the free exercise of first
amendment rights. Mr. Justice Black in the dissenting opinion of Barenblatt
points out that the public interest is "... the interest of the people as a
whole in being able to join organizations, advocate causes and make political
'mistakes' without later being subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves."3
The investigating committee does not impose the more modern penalties
of fine or imprisonment on a witness who testifies. The punishment that
Justice Black was speaking of is an older form of punishment, that of public
scorn, shame and hatred. 39 This punishment follows the exposure of extremely unpopular associational relationships and beliefs. It is fear of this
type of punishment that will prevent the free exercise of first amendment
rights. It operates as a deterrent upon the exchange of ideas or views,
excepting those that enjoy current approval.
Thus, the public interest in the free exercise of first amendment rights
36 Whitney

v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
37 See H.R. Rep. No. 2431, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952) ; H.R. Rep. No. 2516, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1952) ; H.R. Rep. No. 2747, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942).
38
Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 26,.at 144 (dissenting opinion).
s9 ANDRws, Oiz-TmE PuNiqx s

1-145, 164-187 (1890 ed.).
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must be included on the side of the individual interest and balanced against
the interests of government in obtaining the desired information. 0
A Lack of Standards for Evaluation
The Court's opinion in the Barenblattcase does not mention any consideration of "public interest" being included on the side of the individual
interest. It is possible that the majority of the Court felt that the individual
interest did not properly include any public interest and therefore was not
to be included in the balancing process. If this were true, then the governmental interest in national security would readily justify the compulsion of
testimony. Of course the Court may have considered the individual interest
as including a measure of public interest and still determined the weight of
interest in the government's favor, but nothing to this effect was mentioned.
As said before, the balancing process cannot be done properly unless
all the interests to be balanced are recognized and given proper weight.
Only then can an articulate judgment be made. The balancing process does
not, however, provide any definite standards upon which the court can rely
in making its judgment. The process merely ascribes to the courts the duty
of determining when individual freedoms protected by the first amendment
must yield to the subordinating interests of the government. The lack of
any standards upon which the judgment is made tends to put the witness in
a precarious position. He must determine at the time of the investigation
whether his interests are to be subordinated to the government's interest
without any guides for his decision. If the witness fails to anticipate the
court's decision, he is subject to a penalty for contempt.
JudicialControl of the Power of Investigation
In establishing some sort of ascertainable limits to the congressional
power of investigation, the courts may have to resort to something other
than the balancing of interests process. The power of the court to inquire
into the purpose of a congressional investigation appears to be firmly established.4' The power to declare an investigation bad when the court determines that no valid legislative purpose is being served is also firmly established.42 An investigation purely for the sake of exposure has been recognized as not furthering a legislative purpose.4 8 Therefore, Congress is without power to require a witness to reveal his associational relationships or
political beliefs if the purpose of the investigation is exposure for the sake of
exposure.

44

40
"The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if
life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country
may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way." CmkYa-za,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 33, 34.
41 Sinclair v. United States, supra note 11; Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra note 9.
42 United States v. Rumely, supra note 6.
4
3 Watkins v. United States, supra note 5.
44 Id. at 200.
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By using these controls which the court has over the power of investigation, in connection with a test which the court has adopted in other types of
cases, it is felt that more definite standards for evaluation could be attained.
The test to which the writer is referring has been termed the "rational legislator test."
Why the JudicialReluctance to Assert Its Control
Before discussing this test, it seems necessary to determine the reason
for the Court's reluctance to exercise its control over the power of investigation. Although the reason has not been clearly stated, it appears to be based
on the doctrine of separation of powers. The courts feel that they would
be intruding into the legislative domain of Congress if they inquired into
the purpose of the investigation when it is conducted in an area where
Congress might properly legislate.
In the case of McCray v. United States45 the Court considered alleged
abuses of congressional power in imposing taxes which resulted in the regulation of use of artificial coloring in making oleomargarine. The Court, after
deciding that Congress was acting within the scope of its lawful power in
passing the tax law, determined that the judiciary lacked the authority to
restrain the exercise of such power even if the power was abusively exerted.
The Court reasoned that to restrain such power "... .would be to overthrow
the entire distinction between the legislative, (and) judicial .. departments
of the government .... "I"
The reasoning of the McCray case was approved in the Barenblatt
case1 7 Thus the Court seemed to be recognizing that while the congressional
power of investigation might be abusively exerted the Court was powerless
to remedy such abuse, because to do so wouldbe an abuse of judicial power.
The judiciary is charged with the duty of upholding the Constitution
and, since the case of Marbury v. Madison,48 has exercised the power of
judicial review. In exercising this power the court determines "... . whether
a given manifestation of authority has exceeded the power conferred by that
instrument (the Constitution) .... ,,4' The Court has recognized that the
congressional power of investigation is necessary to carry out the express
legislative powers granted to Congress, but such power is valid only so
long as a valid legislative purpose is being served. Thus the power of investigation differs greatly in its scope from the power to tax which was attacked
in the McCray case. The taxing power, being expressly granted in the Constitution, 0 knows no other limits than those imposed by that instrument.
So the judiciary is without authority to impose limitations on the power
even if it is exercised abusively and for some purpose other than raising
45 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
4
0 Id. at 54.
47360 U.S. at 132, 133.
48 5 U.S. (1 CranCh) 137 (1803).
49

McCray v. United States, supra note 45, at 54.
50 U.S. Consr. art. 1, § 8, ci. 1.
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revenue unless the purpose is prohibited by the Constitution.5 The validity
of the power of investigation, on the other hand, depends upon it being
exercised for a specific purpose, i.e. in aid of legislative processes. So the
Court would not be exceeding the bounds of judicial authority by defining
and limiting the power of investigation to prevent its abuse, and setting up
a test as a basis for determining when such power is improperly used.
Reasons other than the doctrine of separation of powers have been advanced by the courts as grounds for the judiciary's lack of authority to
prevent abuses of the power of investigation. One such reason is that if
the authorizing resolution which creates the committee declares that the
information sought is for a valid legislative purpose, then such declaration
is conclusive on the courts, even though statements by the committee members suggest the contrary.5" This appears to be no more than an instrument
put forth by the court to avoid court review of the committee's purpose in
compelling certain testimony. Although the court may presume that such
inquiry is in furtherance of a valid legislative purpose, such presumption
should not be conclusive. The courts presume that legislation passed by
Congress does not offend the Constitution, yet this presumption is not
conclusive. Where the Court has determined that legislation does in fact
violate the Constitution, it has been struck down.5" There is no reason for
indulging a stronger presumption in the one situation than in the other.
Another reason which has been advanced is that a possible abuse of the
congressional power of investigation is no reason to deny the power.5 4 This
again appears to be no more than an instrument used to avoid court review
of the committee's action. There is no need to deny the power of investigation in order to correct possible abuses of the power. All that is necessary
is that the judiciary define the limits of the power and devise standards to
insure to the fullest possible extent that the power is not exercised beyond
its proper limits. This would not result in a stifling or denial of the power
of investigation; it would merely be limiting its operation to its proper
scope.
In order to justify the position that the Court lacks authority to remedy
abuses of the power of investigation, the power to correct such abuses is
said to be in the hands of the people. 5 As a practical matter this affords
little if any protection to witnesses who have embraced political doctrine
which is extremely unpopular with the great majority of the people. In the
first place the majority of the people are not inclined to criticize the action
51 McCray v. United States, supra note 45; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533
(1869).
52

United States v. Josephson, supranote 17, at 89.

53 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).

54 Barsky v. United States, supra note 20, at 250.
55 Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 26 at 132, 133. The Court quoting from McCray
v. United States, supra note 45, approves the principle there stated which declares the judiciary
has no authority to restrain a lawful exercise of power by another department of government,
even though it may result in an abuse of such power. The remedy for the abuse lies with the
people.
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of a congressional committee which is dealing with people who are or have
been associated with organizations which have been declared by Congress to
be subversive in character. Secondly, where a committee's methods have
been criticized, those who ventured such criticism were stigmatized by the
committee even though they had no connection or affiliation with any
organization under investigation. 6 Thus the possibility of the people taking
effective action to remedy possible abuses of the congressional power of
investigation, when an extremely unpopular minority is the object of the
investigation, seems rather far fetched.
Congressional Investigations and "cDueProcess of Law"
The rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution are not absolute.
Under particular circumstances the right to life itself may be forfeited
without doing violence to constitutional guaranties. 5 Although the language
of the first amendment is unequivocal, the Supreme Court has decided that
speech is not beyond legislative control. When the legislature has determined, subject to court review, that certain kinds of speech represent a
substantial evil which the legislature may rightly prevent, the prevention
of such speech may warrent criminal sanction.5" Thus a penalty may be
imposed upon the use of certain kinds of speech without violating the
provisions of the first amendment.
Congressional investigations do not directly operate to impose a
penalty on the use of speech. The restrictions on the first amendment
freedoms arise only as an incident to the investigations. The restrictions
flow from the compelled disclosure of political beliefs and associational
relationships which are extremely unpopular to the majority of the people.
This situation may be likened to that where a state in the exercise of its
police power passes legislation which indirectly operates to restrict personal
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Although the Constitution does
not guaranty any absolute liberty, it does guaranty that no person shall
be deprived of liberty without "due process of law. '59
State regulation for the public welfare has resulted in the control of the
use of private property," in restriction of the types of buildings that may be
erected in certain areas,6 1 and the direct control of the price at which a
merchant may sell certain products.' Such regulations impose restrictions
on personal liberties. However such limitations on personal liberties as are
necessary for the protection of the health, safety, morals and welfare of
56 See H.R. Rep. No. 3248, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950) ; see also H.R. Rep. No. 2277, 77th
Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1942).
57
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1951).
5
8 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
59
Thomas v. Collins, supra note 15.
60Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 562 (1916).
1
6 Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
62
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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the general public are upheld if the regulation meets the requirements of
"due process of law." 63
"Due process" requires that a law or exercise of a power "shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. ''es
The courts through the process of judicial review determine whether a law
or exercise of power is unreasonable or arbitrary and whether the means
selected are reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose. 65
In considering whether a regulation or exertion of power meets the
requirements of "due process," the court does not substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature. The court considers the question in the light of
whatever is relevant to a legislative judgment, and such judgment is not to
be ". . . overturned merely because the court would have made a different
choice ... had the initial choice been for it to make."66

While the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, neither does it evaluate the regulation from the point of view of
legislators who are elected to give expression to majority views. In considering whether a law or exertion of power is reasonable, the court is really
asking itself this question: Could a rationallegislator reasonably believe
that this law will accomplish a proper legislative purpose? If the court
decides this question affirmatively, then the regulation or exertion of power
is upheld."7
The determination of this judicial question involves the consideration
of existing ills or threats to the general public welfare, the possible effectiveness of the regulation designed to remedy the existing situation, and the
deprivation of individual liberty or property which will result from such
regulation.68 The court also considers the possibility of attaining the desired
results by alternative methods which would result in less deprivation of
liberty or property.69
It would not seem to be an abuse of judicial authority by the courts to
require the proceedings of a congressional investigation to meet the demands of substantive "due process." In fact, since the effects of the investigations tend to limit the free exercise of first amendment rights, the
demands of "due process" seem very much in order.
If congressional investigation proceedings which operated to restrict
the exercise of first amendment freedoms were subjected to the requirements of substantive "due process," the court would have sound standards
for determining the propriety of such inquiries and preventing abuses of
the power of investigation. The exertion of the committee's power of investi6

3 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
e4 Nebbia v. New York, supra note 62, at 525.
65 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 400 (1923).
66
Dennis v. United States, supra note 58, at 540 (concurring opinion).
67 Id. at 539-41.
6
8 See Nebbia v. New York, supra note 62.
69 Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
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gation would have to meet the requirement of reasonableness, and it could
not adopt a course which had no substantial relation to a proper legislative
purpose. If a witness could demonstrate that the power had been exercised
substantially as a means of exposure, then the investigation would be
invalid because the power's exercise would bear no "reasonablerelation"to
the gathering of information in aid of the legislative processes.
It is not suggested that the rights of a witness appearing before a congressional investigating committee be determined upon the basis of "due
process" alone. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the first amendment will not yield to legislation which
in other areas would be sustained in the face of attack on "due process"
grounds. 70 It is only suggested that the exertion of the congressional power
of investigation be conditioned by the demands of "due process." Where the
court has determined that the power has been properly exercised, the
"balance of interests" process would be used to determine the paramount
interest as it was used in the Barenblattcase.
Conclusion
The Barenblattcase has given us another example of the never ending
conflicts between an individual and his government. This discussion has
described how the United States Supreme Court resolved this conflict by
balancing the interests of the individual against those of the government.
The conflict arose when a congressional sub-committee engaged in investigating subversive activities called Barenblatt to testify about his Communist affiliations. Barenblatt refused to answer and was cited aid convicted for contempt. Barenblatt's refusal was based in part upon the contention that the first amendment barred such inquiries.
The power of investigation was found to have its source as a power
necessary and appropriate to carrying out the express legislative powers
granted to Congress in the Constitution. The governmental interest which
the sub-committee represented was recognized as that of national security,
the prevention of overthrow of the government by force and violence.
Balanced against the government's interest was Barenblatt's interest in
keeping his unpopular associations and beliefs to himself. Based upon the
interests put in balance the Court understandably determined those of
Barenblatt to be subordinate to those of the government. The Court did not
discuss the possibility of Barenblatt's interest in remaining silent as including any public interest in first amendment rights.
Failure to recognize any public interest in Barenblatt's silence, or failure
to discuss it if it were recognized, leaves the issue somewhat doubtful. If
the Court could be convinced that public interest in first amendment rights
should be balanced on the side of the individual, then a different decision
might be forthcoming in later cases. In either event it would be desirable
7
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for the Court to spell out the interests to be balanced as rough guides for
future decisions. A witness would then be in a better position to determine
whether his interests would be subordinated to those of Congress prior to
any refusal to testify.
In considering alleged abuses of the power of investigation, the Court
recognized that there is no congressional power of exposure. However the
Court went on to say that the motives of the committee members would not
vitiate an investigation if the legislative purpose of Congress was being
served. It would not seem to make any difference whether the motive which
impells the exercise of a power is good or bad-a good motive does not
necessarily mean that an exercise of a power is valid, nor a bad motive mean
that such exercise is invalid.
However in the case of the congressional power of inquiry the purpose
for which the power is exerted is important. As has been pointed out the
power of investigation is valid only when used to augment the legislative
functions of Congress. This entails the gathering of information for purposes of passing legislation or making appropriations. It is not valid when
exercised for the purpose of exposure. Therefore the court has the power
to declare an investigation bad if it is not serving a valid legislative purpose.
In order to prevent possible abuses of the power of investigation, it
is felt that the suggested standards of "due process" should be met by
committee proceedings. The restrictions on the exercise of first amendment rights which result from such investigations clearly justify such
requirements.
It is hoped that the court will recognize the need for some such control
of the power of investigation and will not relegate the protection of the
rights of minorities to the people of the majority.

